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INTRODUCTION

American states and municipalities have
provided private companies with economic
development incentives -- property tax
abatements, low-interest loans, grants for
expansion -- since this country’s inception.
Over the last twenty years the practice has
grown exponentially, and with this growth
has come more complex public financing
instruments like Tax Increment Financing
(TIF). Today, it is safe to say that every city,
county, and state offers some kind of
incentive to prospective and existing
businesses. The average state provides
more than 30 different kinds of economic
development subsidies, many of which are
administered by local or regional bodies.

companies often relocate or fail to create
the jobs and other public benefits
promised. 3 Critics point to empirical
evidence that incentives cost more than the
public benefits they create and redirect
monies from other important public goods
like infrastructure and education. And
there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that
incentives poison inter-jurisdictional
relations, contribute to sprawl, favor large
businesses over small, strain the planning
capacity of local government, and are
subject to cronyism and abuse.4 Good
government advocates and libertarians
alike regularly call for an end to such
practices.

With this growth has also come heavy
criticism from taxpayers accusing the public
sector of giving away too much for too
little. Total state and local spending for
jobs is now estimated at more than $50
billion a year.1 In the Time magazine cover
story entitled “What Corporate Welfare
Costs” the authors found that federal, state
and local incentives cost “every working
man and woman in America the equivalent
of two weekly paychecks” each year.2

But demands for federal legislation that
would eliminate the practice of incentives
have been largely ignored. Critics admit
that, despite their general distaste for
incentives and the competitive interjurisdictional relations they create, such
programs are difficult to condemn across
the board. Incentives, along with zoning
and land use regulations, are one of the
few sources of bargaining leverage that
local governments have over developers
and businesses. They use the leverage in
attempts to strategically influence sitelocation decisions and the magnitude of
private investment. Whereas some
jurisdictions are held hostage to demands
of businesses and sign off on expensive

It is not clear what taxpayers are getting in
return. Studies have revealed that state
and local incentives are often not costeffective mechanisms for economic
development because subsidized
1
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long-term commitments, other states and
cities are able to negotiate better
agreements. These local governments
absorb relatively little risk and commit
relatively little up-front investment in
relation to the public benefits created.
Our position is that if economic
development agencies intend to continue
the practice of offering incentives, they
should do it in a smarter manner.
Administrators must focus their energies
not on rolling out the red carpet for any
interested party, but on ending up with
deals that make fiscal sense and protect
the agency (and the taxpayers) in the event
of a breach by the incentive recipient.
Some of this might come by pushing for
more detailed statutes and ordinances that
govern the incentive relationship. But the
most important opportunity -- and most
often squandered -- is the negotiation and
drafting of individual contracts. That
government agencies often overlook
opportunities for promoting the public
good in this process should come as no
surprise: while such contractual
mechanisms have been used in Europe for
decades, they have only recently become
accepted practice in the United States.
Without a comprehensive guide to drafting
contracts that make incentive recipients
more accountable to taxpayers and
residents, economic development
departments must either reinvent the
wheel every time they wish to grant an
incentive or rely on standardized
“boilerplate” contracts that may not offer
them the protection they need because
they are old or do not sufficiently account
for the particularities of the deal.
Conversations with practitioners reveal
that, especially in smaller municipalities
and counties, they waste time calling

around to other local governments or
negotiating with their legal departments
over exact wording. Even when they are
seeking to make incentives more
economically efficient, practitioners lack
adequate information about the different
legal mechanisms and techniques that
would allow them to do so.
This handbook is designed to provide local
economic development practitioners with
an important tool. It takes the reader stepby-step through the different elements of
contracts that treat public incentive
packages as a quid pro quo for public
benefits. Each section discusses a different
element of the ideal deal: valuation of
public costs and benefits, performance
standards, disclosure and oversight, and
enforcement. In each section we provide
detailed examples of model provisions
used by local governments in their
incentive legislation, ordinances, and
contracts -- information that has not before
been obtained or recorded in any
systematic way. These examples are meant
to both illustrate the key principles for
negotiating ideal deals and also serve as
templates for actual contract language.
They are supplemented with commentary
culled from interviews conducted with
local government officials, academic
studies, and reports by watchdog
organizations around the country.
Giving away tax revenues with few strings
attached is not an effective way of meeting
policy objectives or managing public
finances. Following the best practices
provided in this handbook is a first step
toward designing legally enforceable
contracts that can protect public interests
and more widely distribute the benefits of
economic development.
2

BACKGROUND

Development incentives and regulatory
environments matter less to companies
when deciding between distinct regions of
the country. The availability and cost of
skilled labor, occupancy costs, proximity to
key customers and suppliers,
transportation and utility costs, and the
whims of corporate executives are more
important at this stage. Once a company
has narrowed its choice of location to a
particular region, however, it begins to
consider the tax burden and physical
characteristics of potential sites. The site
location decision could be a relatively
private affair: the business purchases land,
hires a developer and employees, and pays
whatever taxes it is determined to owe.
Aside from obtaining the requisite building
permits and complying with existing
zoning and environmental regulations, the
business could have little contact with the
public sector.
Negotiations ensue only if the business
wants something more from local
government, or the local government
wants something more from business.
What that “more” is is often contested
because public and private responsibilities
in economic development are not fixed and
unchanging. The principle, for example,
that a city should not be responsible for
the development costs of individual
businesses (because this falls squarely
3

within a private realm) is difficult to
support given the long history of public
assistance to business. The recent history
of intense incentive use has blurred the
boundaries of public and private roles
making it impossible to defer to principle
or precedent. Every case, therefore, must
be negotiated on its own merits.
While contracts will vary, it is clear that
without legally enforceable one specifying
the obligations of the respective parties, an
economic development incentive will be
considered a gift and not part of a quid pro
quo exchange. This distinction is not just
semantic; it is difficult, if not impossible, to
tell someone how to use a gift. Consider
the following three examples:
****
The Triangle Corporation decided to move
equipment out of its Diamond Tool plant in
Duluth, Minnesota after the city issued $10
million in Industrial Development Revenue
Bonds to finance the corporation’s
acquisition and modernization there.
When the City of Duluth sued, the court
found that “while the parties discussed a
restriction which would have required
Triangle to guarantee certain employment
levels at the company. . . the party’s final
agreement did not contain specific
employment levels.” Any provision to tie
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the incentive to the jobs was therefore
unenforceable.5
****
When the township of Ypsilanti and the
County of Washtenaw, Michigan sought to
recover $13.5 million of a much larger
package of tax abatements from General
Motors (GM) Corporation after GM
announced plans to close its auto assembly
plant and consolidate production in
Arlington, Texas.6 The company had
employed 4,500 workers at its Willow Run
plant.
The local governments claimed that GM
had a made a binding promise to produce
cars at Willow Run in return for the tax
abatements. Although the trial court judge
ruled in their favor, GM got the decision
overturned on appeal. The appellate court
held that public statements by GM that
were previously interpreted as promises
were actually “expressions of hopes or
expectations that operations would
continue at Willow Run.” The appeals
court suggested that any company would
“tak(e) advantage of statutory
opportunities” to obtain a tax abatement
and that GM had made no real assurances
of continued employment.
****
The City of Roanoke, Virginia authorized a
grant of $500,000 to First Union National
Bank to train 200 new workers and retain
359 existing jobs.7 First Union signed a
contract with the City to keep all of these
jobs in its downtown branch for at least
five years. After one year the bank had
drawn down $326,000 of the grant, yet
there were not only no new jobs, the bank
had actually reduced the number of
previously existing ones. It subsequently

announced that it would close the entire
downtown loan servicing operation.
Luckily, the City of Roanoke had signed a
contract with First Union that specified the
number of jobs the bank had promised to
create and maintain and the period of time
over which this promise was to be binding.
In addition, the contract contained
provisions which required that the bank
pay the city $400 for each job it did not
create. When the bank failed to create the
promised number of jobs, it refunded the
money it owed and modified the contract
with the city to create jobs in a different
neighborhood branch.
****
The experiences of Duluth, Ypsilanti, and
Roanoke make clear that contracts play an
important role in holding companies to
their promises of job creation and local
investment. Contracts – also known as
development, redevelopment, or incentive
agreements – are the focus of this
handbook because they are the
embodiment of all the different aspects of
economic development deal-making
process.
Drafting a contract that specifies promised
benefits and includes enforcement
measures is not difficult to do. In fact, the
idea is quite simple: if developers and
companies seek financial assistance from
the public sector in order to start-up or
expand their operations, they must be
prepared to: (a) invest in the community
through job creation and capital
investment; (b) treat local governments as
they would any other contracting party;
and (c) expect consequences for breaching
their agreement. Contract law will govern
how an agreement is drafted and how
4
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courts will interpret it.
Contract law is, however, state law, and
state legislation plays a critical role in
drafting and enforcing good contracts. In
our federal system, states possess more
regulatory powers than municipalities and
counties. As such, courts tend to defer to
states and their legislatures when
enforcing incentive contracts. If the
legislature expresses a clear intent to
promote specific goals through their
economic development programs, even
judges who are hostile to these goals will
find themselves constrained to a degree to
respect that intent. Having state statutes
that embody the aforementioned principles
allows for the imposition of conditions that
could not be attained in contract
negotiations but must be accepted as a
matter of law. Moreover legislation is
uniform throughout the state and
establishes identifiable standards that
reduce destructive inter-municipal
competition.
The strongest contracts, therefore, are
those whose key provisions are reinforced
by similar and strong legislation. In the
following pages we offer model language
that can be adopted in individual
development agreements and contracts
local governments sign with subsidized
businesses as well as in state statutes and
municipal ordinances.
Moreover, in each state, special rules will
govern the terms of individual contracts.
While we choose to focus on some of the
most important and generally valid
principles, the handbook is not intended to
be a substitute for the advice of local legal
counsel.

5

SECTION ONE:
VALUING PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS
Before any subsidy changes hands, local
officials should have a solid understanding
of the value of the expected public benefits
and the real public costs of the incentives
offered. Unfortunately, whether due to a
perceived lack of technical precision or
pressure to approve deals quickly, many
officials do not thoroughly evaluate the
costs and benefits of their subsidy
programs. For example, a survey of local
economic development practitioners
showed only 24 percent possessed
quantitative techniques for analyzing
deals.8
Even when quantitative measures are
developed, they often fail to capture the
true costs and benefits due to bad
accounting practices. Most local
governments tally benefits on the revenue
side of the ledger, including property
taxes, paybacks and profit sharing. On the
expense side, however, costs typically
include only direct cash outlays. They
exclude the opportunity costs tied to
below-market interest rates, deferred
paybacks, loan guarantees, and in-kind
expenses.
They exclude tax expenditures, which are
the most important and yet most
misunderstood type of subsidy. If
accounting practices do not recognize
these different kinds of expenditures or fail

to acknowledge how incentives are often
backed by promises to be paid by future
revenues, accounts can not be considered
to be in balance.9
Indeed, one of the reasons why incentives
are so attractive to local governments is
that they are often made off budget.
Although more than half of all states now
require “tax expenditure budgets” (that are
intended to record the opportunity costs of
any uncollected tax revenues in addition to
any appropriated expenditures), their
quality and exhaustiveness is uneven.
Local governments that wish to better
manage their finances in this area are
urged to follow the advice listed below.

Estimate how much the public
benefits are “worth” relative to
the amount of the subsidy
Most municipalities and many states do not
have the expertise to conduct
comprehensive cost-benefit analyses of
incentive deals to determine whether the
local benefits justify the loss of tax
revenues. Cost-benefit analysis allows the
analyst to compare the present value of
anticipated public costs (e.g., cash
expenses, foregone revenues and
additional expenditures on services, such
as schools and infrastructure) to the
present value of expected benefits (e.g., tax
6
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revenues and fees, new jobs, revenues
generated by salaries of new employees
and multiplier effects) ex ante.
This form of analysis can determine if the
costs of subsidies are likely to outweigh
the revenues generated over a particular
time period, thus alerting public officials to
the fact that a deal may provide too little
payback for the expected expenses
incurred. Cost-benefit spreadsheet
programs can help the public sector
determine the “tipping point” (less subsidy,
more public benefits) at which the deal
makes financial sense.
Commercially-available software programs,
such as IMPLAN and Regional Economic
Models Incorporated (REMI), or ones
developed by universities, such as the
University of Illinois at Chicago, allow
government officials to evaluate both the
employment and revenue impacts of
potential incentive deals.10 Missouri and
Indianapolis use cost-benefit programs
developed by private consultants to
analyze each potential project. Many costbenefit analyses are really only evaluating
the fiscal impacts on the local government,
i.e., the public expenditure and revenue
effects of a subsidy, instead of the benefits
and costs related to the induced and
indirect employment ostensibly spurred by
the corporate relocation or expansion. In
Indianapolis, for example, if the fiscal
impact analysis shows that it will take more
than four years for a particular project to
offer a positive revenue return to the city,
it is not considered a project that is eligible
for incentives.
Both fiscal impact analysis and cost-benefit
analysis provide a ballpark estimate of how
much each subsidized job or dollar of new
revenue will cost. Armed with this
7

information, local governments can cap the
amount of incentives available. The U.S.
Small Business Administration and the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban
Development have subsidy limits of
$35,000 per created or retained job.11
A handful of states have followed their
lead. Illinois’ Department of Commerce
and Economic Opportunity caps incentives
at $10,000 per job created or retained
through its Community Development
Assistance Program. Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and West Virginia
also cap subsidies at $15,000 to $35,000
per job created.
While analytical tools are helpful, it is
important to understand the assumptions
underlying the models in order to feel
confident of their predictive power. There
are two areas where the spreadsheet
models could stand to be improved. First,
prospective public benefits like physical
improvements and environmental cleanup
may be difficult to value because, in most
instances and without the use of
sophisticated modeling, they have no
obvious market price. Second, many local
costs of subsidies are often shifted to the
state or federal governments, and these
intergovernmental transfers are not
captured by cost-benefit analysis
conducted only at the local scale. For
example, the use of tax increment
financing (TIF) by local governments may
trigger additional transfers of aid from the
state to equalize school funding. A more
comprehensive analysis would be inclusive
of costs borne by all levels of government.

Require corporate disclosure of
relevant information
Ideally, local governments would know
how much bargaining leverage they have
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with companies who request their
assistance. What are other municipalities
or states offering the company, and how
important are these incentives to its
investment decisions? Unfortunately,
much of this “market” data is rarely
disclosed. Even worse, many analysts
suggest that, goaded by site selection
consultants, companies frequently
overstate the role of incentives in
determining where companies choose to
expand or relocate, and that many even
decide on their project sites before
governments make subsidy offers.12 In
other words, the financial gap companies
seek to fill to make a project feasible may
be much smaller than they would have the
public sector believe. They can bluff and
demand more than is really necessary
because management has access to
relevant information about the firm’s own
cost structure and hurdle rates to which
local governments are not privy. In
practice, the government that is most
optimistic about the value of economic
development or has the most lax budget
and statutory constraints will be the
highest bidder.
Despite these hurdles, local governments
can make some efforts to ensure that the
incentive is necessary or, at a minimum,
somewhat important to the company’s
location decision. Disclosure requirements
can allow the public sector to gain more
knowledge about a business’ actual costs
and financing needs and may force possible
subsidy recipients to demonstrate their
interest in a particular location. The city of
Minneapolis’ 1998 living wage ordinance,
for example, requires applicants for public
contracts or financial assistance to provide
the names of all programs to which they
are applying and the total public cost of
the assistance.

In Illinois, existing businesses seeking
assistance must provide the state with the
prospective plan for which 1,500 full-time
jobs would be eliminated in the event that
the business is not designated as a “High
Impact Business” (a designation that allows
it to access certain state tax exemptions).
Proposals for new facilities must provide
proof of an alternative non-Illinois site that
would receive the proposed investment
and job creation in the event that the
business is not designated as a High Impact
Business. This increased transparency may
overcome some of the problems associated
with bluffing, and, if staff can check on
counter offers, may deter companies from
playing multiple jurisdictions off each other
in order to ratchet up the price of the
subsidy.
Other incentive programs require that
applicants disclose their development and
operating pro forma and identify gaps that
they are seeking to have filled by public
assistance. Government personnel need to
be financially literate enough to make
sense of these spreadsheets, be familiar
with current cost estimates, and identify
costs that are being overstated.
While disclosure requirements may place a
burden on the corporate subsidy-seeker to
demonstrate that they are serious about
relocating, these provisions are generally
less effective (i.e., legally binding) than
those we will discuss in the following
chapters. For example, it is easy to falsify
or exaggerate a firm’s cost structure for
strategic effect. Development consultants
regularly admit that firms draft separate
pro forma for separate purposes (e.g.,
understating revenues for incentive and
income tax purposes while overstating
them for lenders).
8
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Local governments should be aware that
disclosure requirements are among the
weaker forms of subsidy accountability and
although they may be included in
contracts, they offer few substantive
protections. If they are going to be
required, they must be used in tandem
with impact analysis, performance
standards, and enforceability mechanisms.

Avoid reliance on “but for”
provisions
Incentive programs often require the
company to attest to the fact that it would
not have considered the municipality as a
potential location or would have
eliminated a certain number of jobs but for
the incentive. For example, the Michigan
Economic Growth Act (MEGA) provides
that:
The tax credits authorized under the
agreement address the competitive
disadvantages of locating in Michigan
instead of a site outside of the state; the
project will not occur in Michigan
without the tax credits offered by this
agreement. If the company
misrepresents itself by making this
statement, the authority may revoke the
company’s eligibility for further credits.13
Sometimes these “but for” clauses even
come with teeth. In Illinois, for example, if
a business receives the designation of
“High Impact Business” in order to access
certain state tax exemptions and it is later
determined that the business would have
made the investment and created or
retained the requisite number of jobs
without the benefits of the designation, the
state department of economic
development will revoke that
designation.14 It is also supposed to notify
9

the state department of revenue to begin
proceedings to recover all wrongfully
exempted state taxes with interest (i.e.,
clawbacks, a contractual provision we
discuss in more detail in Section Four).
All of these types of “but for” provisions
are intended to protect against the
possibility that the firm does not really
need the subsidy but is taking advantage of
its superior bargaining position (the fact
that firms are mobile but governments are
not) to seek whatever assistance is
available. The problem with these
provisions is that they create a false sense
of security. “But for” clauses are
notoriously easy to elude and difficult to
disprove – so difficult, in fact, that few
states or cities actually enforce them.
How, after all, can one demonstrate
definitively that the incentive does or does
not matter in a firm’s location decision?
What constitutes proof that an expansion
decision was made only because of the
incentive? Research has consistently
demonstrated that subsidies are rarely the
deal-makers or deal-breakers; other factors
tend to be much more important in the
location decision-making calculus of a
firm.15
“But for” provisions are very common in
state statutes and redevelopment
agreements despite the fact that they do
not really guard against bluffing. It is
critical to remember that they are no
substitute for strong performance
standards, oversight provisions, and
enforcement mechanisms, topics to which
we now turn.

SECTION TWO:
SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
What is an “ideal deal” from the
perspective of the local government? That
depends on what the local government
hopes to achieve from its economic
development programs. While the answer
to this question may seem obvious (“good
jobs,” “economic diversification,” “a
stronger tax base”), knowing exactly why a
particular community wants economic
development can be difficult to intuit. Is it
more important, for example, to bring in
new jobs for an underemployed but skilled
labor force or to redevelop a deteriorating
section of the main street that has become
an eyesore? Input from key stakeholders
and community residents often provides a
sense of which goals are a priority. Once
these goals have been defined, they can
then be translated into specific, legally
binding performance standards.

Identify the authorizing statute
The goals of economic development
programs and the authority to give
incentives are often contained in state
statutes, which can be used to guide
municipalities through the incentive
process. And while the guidance might be
very general, it is nonetheless important to
refer to the statute in local agreements and
mimic its language. For example:

The MEGA Program was created by the
Michigan Economic Growth Authority
Act, Act No.24 of Public Acts of 1995. It
gives Michigan municipalities the power
to provide tax credits to businesses
involved in manufacturing, mining,
research, development, wholesale, trade
and/or office operations, and enterprise
for the purpose of . . .16
Referencing the authorizing statute
ensures that there is no ambiguity about
the purpose of the contract and the
authority to make it. It will also put the
incentive recipient on notice of any
statutory obligations that may not be
contained in the contract itself.
It is important to remember that the
authorizing statute typically sets a floor,
not a ceiling, for the amount of control and
the number of conditions a grantor may
put on an incentive. This means city,
regional, and state agencies have a certain
amount of discretion to require behavior
from assisted developers and companies
above and beyond that required by statute
or regulation.

10
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Articulate performance
standards as specifically as
possible
The public goals of the incentive must be
stated explicitly so that it is possible to
evaluate the extent to which the firms
granted the inducements are complying
with the conditions imposed. It is
generally a mistake to be vague;
“stimulating the economy,” “creating
jobs,” and “increasing the tax base” are
suitable as intent language in authorizing
statutes. But they are not appropriate for
development contracts because they are so
open-ended that they impose no effective
constraints on the granting authority nor
do they give the courts much meaningful
guidance in interpreting contractual
conditions.
The terms of a contract must be clear in
order to be enforceable. Ordinary words
should be used in their ordinary contexts.
Technical terms should be defined. If there
is more than one reasonable definition,
state which one is intended in the
document itself. Contracts that rely on
very loose parameters of fulfillment are
considered “incomplete” and provide
parties with opportunities to exploit
existing gaps.
Some states have taken steps to limit such
gaps. For example, Minnesota requires
state agencies and municipalities to
develop explicit benchmarks for awarding
subsidies. These public purpose
benchmarks include standards for job
creation and for the wages of the new jobs.
Moreover, job retention is only considered
a legitimate criterion “where job loss is
imminent and demonstrable.”17 The law
includes an exemption for business loans
11

and loan guarantees of $75,000 or less to
ensure that job creation and wage
requirements do not harm start-up
businesses, particularly those in lowincome communities. The law requires
each incentive-granting agency to submit
their benchmarks to the Department of
Employment and Economic Development
and for the department to publish them
annually.
If a term is ambiguous, its meaning may
have to be interpreted by a judge. And
courts cannot be counted on to find legally
binding obligations that may seem obvious
to the contracting parties at the time the
contract is made but are not written in the
contract itself. They often defer to the
Parole Evidence Rule, which excludes any
evidence of prior or contemporaneous
agreements from consideration in a
dispute over the interpretation of a
contract.
This is especially true for mortgage
agreements and other loan documents.
Courts interpret loan contracts according
to the principles and purposes of loan
security. If the municipality signs a
mortgage agreement with a firm for a lowinterest loan, it must also specify the wider
purpose of the incentive or else the court’s
primary concern will be the company’s
adherence to conventional loan terms (e.g.,
making payments on time, collateral
security). For example, the state of West
Virginia loaned over $64 million to Anchor
Hocking to help the company keep its plant
open and provide jobs to its employees.
Unfortunately it failed to state these
purposes in the actual loan documents.
The absence of a specific goal, coupled
with a contractual provision allowing
prepayment of the loan without penalty,
led the court to conclude that the firm
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satisfied its obligations by paying off the
loan.18
Given these perils, the written contract
should represent the complete
understanding between the parties. In the
following sections, we provide examples of
the language used in contracts across the
country to describe the different kinds of
public benefits that local governments may
pursue through their use of incentives.

JOB CREATION AND RETENTION
Performance standards typically make
incentives conditional on employment
projections. An early study of nine grant
and loan programs found that all required
recipient firms to specify projected job
creation.19
Local governments use two kinds of
payment provisions for securing these
benefits. The first sets a threshold job
creation requirement as a condition for
receiving public assistance. The second
offers a specific amount of incentive on a
per-job basis. An example of a threshold
requirement is the Iowa New Jobs and
Income Agreement, which provides that:
The (subsidized) business must create at
least 50 new full-time jobs at the project
location within five years of the
application approval and must maintain
that level for five years after first meeting
that obligation.20
A business taking advantage of Michigan’s
Economic Growth Act (MEGA) program:
(M)ust create 75 new jobs if it is
expanding its facility within Michigan,
150 jobs if it is relocating to the state;
and 25 jobs if the facility is relocating to
a state enterprise zone.21

The second kind of provision does not
provide any funds to the company until the
job has been created. “Back-loading”
incentives based on the number of jobs is
an attractive option for local governments.
This kind of payment clause can potentially
protect the jurisdiction’s investment in
case the company is not successful or falls
behind in its hiring schedule.
The $2.5 million incentive package
negotiated between Bismarck, North
Dakota and Coventry Healthcare contained
a provision that gave Coventry
incrementally larger payments as hiring
progressed.22 The city was thus allowed to
withhold its largest payment until the final
group of employees had been hired.
Another example of contract language that
requires incentives to be calibrated to
successive employment levels is from
Vermont’s Small Business Investment Tax
Credit:
A person may receive a credit against its
income taxes in an amount equal to five
to ten percent of its investments within
the state of Vermont in excess of
$150,000 in plants or facilities and
machinery and equipment in the
applicable tax year according to the
following:
1) A person employing fewer than 150
full-time employees may receive an
income tax credit equal to ten percent
of its investments in plants or
facilities and machinery and
equipment in the applicable tax year.
2) A person employing between 150 and
250 full-time employees may receive
an income tax credit of six to nine
percent of its investments in plants or
12
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facilities and machinery and
equipment in the applicable tax year
based on the following proportional
sliding scale:
(a) a nine percent tax credit for 150174 full-time employees;
(b) an eight percent tax credit for
175-199 full-time employees;
(c) a seven percent tax credit for
200-224 full-time employees; and
(d) a six percent tax credit for 225250 full-time employees.
3) A person employing more than 250
full-time employees may receive an
income tax credit equal to five percent
of its investment in plants or
facilities.23
These types of payment clauses are
common with corporate income tax
credits. Standing alone, their inclusion in a
contract is not an entirely foolproof means
of ensuring accountability. Many of the
“new” positions may have been created in
the absence of public assistance; the fact
that they are created before the public
assistance changes hands begs the
question of whether the incentives were
truly necessary from an operating
standpoint. Moreover, local officials may
neglect to place effective monitoring and
enforcement standards (e.g., clawbacks
discussed later) in such contracts because
they feel unduly protected by the presence
of back-end payment schemes.
Regardless of which approach the local
government takes, the contract should
define the kinds of jobs that count toward
job creation and retention goals. Simply
requiring a certain number of “jobs” would
leave a court the option of interpreting its
meaning as either full-time and part-time
13

positions. Generally “full-time” implies
that employees work a minimum of 35
hours per week (this is the case, for
example, in order to qualify for protection
under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974). Contracts in
Iowa include a definition of a “Full-Time
Equivalent Job” as the equivalent of
employment of one person for eight hours
per day for a five day, forty-hour workweek
for fifty weeks per year.24 The employment
tax credit available to financial institutions
in Delaware is only applicable for full-time
employees who are eligible for health
insurance benefits.25 It is always best,
however, not to rely on external sources
for definitions. The best contracts will
state the precise number of hours and
perhaps necessary benefit levels for a
position to count as a “job” under the
terms of the contract.
Contracts can also prohibit the substitution
of existing employees to meet job
requirements. The Ohio Tax Credit statute
excludes from the calculation of “new jobs”
any employee who is hired to replace an
employee who was already employed at
the project location at the time the project
was approved. It also excludes employees
or employment positions that were
transferred to the project location from
another company operation located in
Ohio.26
In 2002, the Kansas Court of Appeals ruled
that “(a) taxpayer business which hires five new
employees but dismisses ten existing employees
has not added five employees.”27 The court’s
decision upheld the denial of a tax
exemption by the Kansas Department of
Revenue to a business that failed to
increase its workforce with enough new
employees to qualify for the exemption.
This case illustrates the need for contracts

SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
that require the hiring of a certain number
of employees to also specify their minimum
period of employment. Otherwise, an
employer could attempt to hire employees
and then terminate them after qualifying
for the subsidy. This is also why, as we will
discuss, it is critical to adopt a monitoring
system that will allow local governments to
oversee the manner in which the assisted
company is adhering to the agreement.

WAGES AND BENEFITS
The number of jobs may be less important
than the quality of the jobs created and
whether or not local residents can fill
them. As such, local governments are
slowly realizing that they must specify
other performance standards that go
beyond job creation and retention targets.
A 2003 survey found that at least 43 states,
41 cities, and 5 counties – a total of 89
jurisdictions – now attach job quality
standards to at least one development
subsidy, up from just two in 1989.28
Many states now require contracts to
specify a particular wage rate. Good Jobs
First reports that wage standards are
generally based on one of three types of
formulas: poverty measures such as the
federal poverty rate or state and federal
minimum wages; static dollar amounts; or
market rates such as the average wage of a
state, region, county, and/or industry.
Market-based wage standards are the most
common type found in state incentive
programs. The Maine Employment Tax
Increment Financing (TIF) and Investment
Tax Credit programs require that wages
must exceed the average per capita income
in the county (or “local area”) where the
company is located.29 The state’s
Governor’s Training Initiative requires that
employees be paid a wage equal to at least

85 percent of the average wage for that
occupation in the given labor market, and
that companies pay at least 50 percent of
health insurance premiums.
Cities and counties are more likely to use
poverty measures to set wage
requirements. For example, Minneapolis,
which imposes wage standards derived
from either regional industry or
occupational averages, also has a living
wage law pegged to the poverty rate.
In most cases, market-based wage
requirements are higher than those based
on poverty standards. For market-based
requirements, it is preferable to use a
median wage measure rather than an
average wage because averages can be
skewed by a few employees earning very
high or low wages. Specifying that the
wage is for hourly non-management jobs
also helps ensure that the wage level is not
skewed by a few higher paying jobs. For
example, the Iowa New Jobs and Income
Agreement states that “the business must pay
a specified median wage for all new full-time
hourly non-management jobs.”
Temporary construction wages may also be
subject to prevailing wage requirements if
they are subsidized by public monies. The
states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia,
and California require that specific grantsubsidized private construction projects
comply with the state’s prevailing
construction wage rates. For example, the
Pennsylvania statute provides:
If the projects for which Grant funds are
to be used involves the construction,
reconstruction, demolition, alteration
and/or repair work other than
maintenance work, done under contract,
where the estimate cost of the total
14
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Project is in excess of $25,000, then the
Grantee shall comply with the provisions
of the Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage
Act.30
Contracts may also require that businesses
provide other benefits to the new or
retained employees. Indeed such
provisions are becoming increasingly
common, particularly at the local level. In
2003, 67 percent of the states with
standards (43) and 80 percent out of cities
and counties with standards (46) offered at
least one incentive program that requires
healthcare benefits be paid at the
subsidized firm or encourages them by
allowing benefits to count towards wage
requirements. For example, the Maine
Quality Centers program requires that
firms create at least eight new full-time
jobs and pay 50 percent of the costs of
health care benefits. An Iowa statute
requires the incentive recipient to pay 80
percent of the cost of a standard medical
and dental insurance plan for all full-time
employees working at the project. This
statute also encourages the provision of
child-care services for employees.31
Many cities allow employers to choose
between providing benefits and paying
higher wages. In 2003, 25 cities and two
counties required companies to pay higher
wages if such companies did not provide
health benefits. The average amount
allotted for benefits was $1.50 per hour,
ranging from $.83 per hour in Duluth to
$2.34 per hour in San Diego. Oakland,
Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Richmond,
California and Burlington, Vermont all
require employees to receive a certain
number of days off for sick, vacation, or
personal leave.
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Unfortunately states and cities often lack
the resources to effectively monitor
benefits that are provided as part of
subsidy deals. Programs may require
companies to offer coverage to employees,
but do not require that employees be
enrolled.

IN-STATE PREFERENCES
The question of whether incentive
programs can require assisted firms to
favor in-state suppliers and employees over
out-of-state ones (i.e., “buy or hire local”) is
legally complex. The Commerce Clause of
the Constitution (Article I, § 8, cl. 3) gives
Congress the power to regulate commerce
to, among other things, prevent interstate
competition at the expense of the national
welfare. It has historically been
interpreted to prevent states and
municipalities from intentionally
discriminating against out-of-state
companies.
However, when the local government acts
as a “market participant,” rather than as a
“regulator of commerce”, an exception may
be made. The Supreme Court has held that
the use of grants and in-kind expenditures,
as opposed to incentives offered as
abatements or credits through the tax
system, may trigger the market participant
exemption in some cases. The rationale
for the distinction is that taxation is a basic
governmental activity representing a
characteristic exercise of sovereign power,
which can be distinguished from a local
government’s voluntary participation in
market transactions. When they are not in
the business of taxation, local governments
can operate more freely in the national
market as buyers and sellers.32
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For example, hiring requirements can
sometimes mandate that the subsidized
business hire workers that are residents of
a particular geographic area (a city, state)
or workers that have been “targeted” for
some other socially relevant reason, e.g.,
individuals transitioning off of public
assistance or out of prisons. The Ohio Tax
Credit Agreement requires that businesses
either display a “good faith effort” or make
substantial progress toward hiring those
most in need of employment. The Ohio
statute requires that:
“Within three years of the project’s initial
operations, the company must show that a
certain percentage (specified by the agency)
of the new employees are either
disadvantaged persons or minorities (as
defined in the statute). The company must
maintain this percentage throughout the
term of the agreement.”
Because it is often unclear whether a
preference would fall within the market
participant exception, that question is best
left to a lawyer. In cases where it is clear
that the exception does not apply – and in
some uncertain cases – legislators and
contract drafters often require a recipient’s
best efforts to meet specified goals. While,
in the eyes of the grantor, these terms may
be less optimal than out-right
requirements, they are still helpful towards
achieving the desired results. For example,
in Idaho, recipients of Community
Development Block Grants must:
to the greatest extent possible, provide
opportunities for training and
employment to lower-income persons
residing within the unit of local
government or the metropolitan area of
non-metropolitan county in which a
project is located. They must award

contracts for work in connection with
such projects, to the greatest extent
feasible, to eligible business concerns
located in or owned in substantial part by
persons residing in the same metropolitan
area or non-metropolitan county as the
project.33
Similarly, Michigan’s MEGA Tax Credit
Agreement requires a good faith effort on
the part of the company:
to employ, if qualified, Michigan residents
at the facility. The company will also
make a good faith effort to employ or
contract with Michigan residents and
firms to construct, rehabilitate, develop,
or renovate the facility.34
Subsidy recipients in Minneapolis, Los
Angeles, and New Britain, Connecticut
must meet guidelines for local hiring.
Cities such as Chicago have required
subsidized firms to make good faith efforts
to hire workers from within city limits.
Unfortunately because these are nonmandatory hiring guidelines, they
guarantee no results. In the end, incentive
recipients retain the autonomy to hire
whomever they please and can easily make
the case that none of the targeted
applicants were employable. And this may
well be the case; employers generally have
a better sense of who would be a good
employee, and there are sometimes
mismatches between employment
opportunities and the skill levels of local
applicants.
Given these issues, it is often preferable to
include specific job marketing, solicitation,
and training provisions in the incentive
contract. These “first source” provisions
generally avoid any Commerce Clause
16
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concerns. They can range from a
requirement that a subsidized firm
advertise jobs through particular channels
that have the greatest potential to reach
targeted candidates, to a requirement to
interview candidates referred from a
specific source. For example, in
Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Portland,
Oregon subsidized firms are encouraged to
sign job linkage agreements, committing
them to hire new employees through a
network of placement and training
community agencies and to post job
vacancies to the network's database.35
Individual contracts can expressly require
such linkages and periodic hiring reports,
and state repercussions for failing to
achieve express local hiring goals.
Contracts can also require the firm to
retain a specific level of new hires over the
life span of the incentive.
And to the extent a contract calls for
cooperation with an employment or
training agency, the choice of agencies can
be left to the grant recipient. The choice
can, however, be limited to agencies prequalified by a state or local government
that are capable of dealing with the
employment needs of particular types of
business. This allows the recipient some
choice to use its expertise to avoid
turnover and attrition while still achieving
laudable social goals.

concerned. An Iowa statute attempts to
protect local workers from employers with
poor records with organized labor. It
provides that:
The employer must represent that it is not
currently involved in a strike, lockout, or
other labor dispute at any of its business
sites in Iowa and that employees receiving
training are not replacement workers
who were hired as a result of a strike
lockout or other labor dispute.36
Similarly, the William S. Lee Quality Jobs
and Business Expansion Act passed by the
North Carolina Legislature provides that:
A taxpayer is eligible for a credit allowed
under this Article only if the taxpayer
certifies that, at the time the taxpayer
applies for the credit, the taxpayer has no
pending administrative, civil, or criminal
enforcement action based on alleged
significant violations of any program
implemented by an agency of the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, and has had no final
determination of responsibility for any
significant administrative, civil, or
criminal violation of any program
implemented by an agency of the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources within the last five years.37

ENVIRONMENTAL AND LABOR PROTECTION

This requirement applies to job, worker
training, investment, and research and
development tax credits.

Some subsidy contracts require the
assisted firm to meet labor and
environmental standards, which can be
higher than those required by existing law
or regulation. Others require the
subsidized company to present a clean bill
of health in so far as unlawful
environmental or labor practices are

Environmental provisions are often
included to protect the value of the
property and to protect the lender from
liability. Pennsylvania loan agreements, for
example, contain provisions requiring
environmental compliance to protect the
lender’s interest in the property.
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THE CITY OF CHICAGO’S DEAL WITH FORD
The City of Chicago and the State of
Illinois crafted an incentive package for
the Ford Motor Company in 2000 that
has some of the qualities of an ideal
deal. Although the Ford plant has
operated in Chicago since 1933, the
company needed to make a critical
decision in the late 1990s due to a
change in product line: to retrofit its
Chicago plant or to relocate. The city of
Hapeville, Georgia (where Ford operated
its Taurus/Sable assembly plant) made
the decision more complicated by
offering Ford an attractive incentive
package.
Despite the offer from Hapeville, Ford
chose not to leave Chicago. The City of
Chicago and the State of Illinois
negotiated a $115 million incentive
package with Ford, which includes both
direct and tax expenditures but does not
cover the cost of the new plant itself – a
measure that ensures Ford has a
financial stake in the deal. Ford agreed
to develop and own an industrial park
whose space is leased to its suppliers,
and the City agreed to develop more
than 900 acres land in the Lake Calumet
area on the city’s far South Side into an
inter-modal freight transfer center.

The standard loan agreement in Ohio also
requires annual environmental inspections,
but like the Pennsylvania template, is
primarily meant to guard against sudden
depreciation of the asset.

Both of these developments converted
brownfield properties into new
productive uses. The new supplier park
was expected to attract approximately
1,000 new jobs and save 2,500
unionized jobs at the Ford assembly
plant. The Ford plant and supplier-park
facility are expected to provide $1.3
billion in tax revenue to the city and
state over 10 years.
The deal has several caveats. Ford must
create a minimum of 1 million square
feet of building space. The company
must also guarantee that it will maintain
the existing union jobs at the main
plant. Clawback provisions require Ford
to create a minimum of 500 full-time
jobs by the end of 2006 and to maintain
these jobs through 2011. If these
provisions are not met, Ford must pay
back a percentage of the financing
proportionate to the percentage of
promised jobs the company failed to
create, and it must repay the city for
infrastructure and road improvements.
Sources: J. McCourt and G. LeRoy, 2003. “A Better
Deal for Illinois” Chicago: Good Jobs Illinois; City of
Chicago Department of Planning and Development
Annual TIF Report (2001); J. Fitzgerald, 2002,
“Retention Deficit Disorder” Boston: Center for an
Urban Future.

CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND PROHIBITIONS TO
RELOCATE

In order for all of the above-mentioned
benefits to materialize, the assisted firm
must continue to invest in its facility and
operate in place over a particular period of
time. There are various measures to use to
18
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control this, many of which may be best
used in tandem. They include stating the
amount of time the company must remain
in place, employment levels, expected long
term capital investment, and levels of
additional square feet of occupancy. Longterm capital investment is subject to less
cyclical variation than employment and
more exacting than square footage
requirements, and therefore may be a
better benchmark for performance.
But whatever combination of these
measures one chooses to employ, it should
include an explicit “stay-in-place”
requirement.
A capital expenditure provision template
from a municipality in Marion County,
Indiana provides that:
The City commits to providing a six-year
real property tax abatement. . . as a result
of the Applicants’ capital expenditure of not
less than $4,950,000 or of not less than
$2,831,400 on leased space associated
with the redevelopment and/or
rehabilitation activities.38
What is critical here is the express tying of
the abatement to a fixed level of
investment.
Although optimal, it is highly unlikely that
a business would promise to stay in one
place in perpetuity – just to fulfill its
obligations for a tax abatement. Still, local
officials should expect a firm to remain in
the locality for a reasonable amount of
time, which is often tied to the length of
the subsidy or abatement. For example, a
Connecticut program prohibits the
recipient “from relocating during the term the
loan is outstanding or for ten years after
receiving assistance, whichever is longer.”39
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Minnesota law requires that the assisted
company obtain the local government’s
permission to move outside of the
community if it moves within five years of
receiving the subsidy. This permission can
only be granted after a public hearing is
held. In Ohio, assisted companies must
maintain their operations at the project
location for twice the number of years as
the term of the tax credit.40 Iowa has
particularly stringent standards:
So long as the Business is indebted to Iowa
Department of Economic Development
(IDED) or Community, the Business shall
not, without prior written disclosure to the
Community and IDED and prior written
consent of IDED, directly of indirectly:
a) assign, waive, or transfer any of
business’ rights, powers, duties, or
obligations under this loan agreement;
b) sell, transfer, convey, assign, encumber,
or otherwise dispose of any of the real
property or other collateral securing the
loan;
c) place or permit any restrictions,
covenants or any similar limitations on
the real property and/or other collateral
securing the loan;
d) remove from the project site of the state
all or any part of the collateral securing
the loan;
e) relocate its operations, physical
facilities of jobs (including Created,
Retained, and Community Base Jobs)
assisted with the loan proceeds outside
the community or abandon its
operations of facilities or a substantial
portion thereof with the community
during the loan term.41
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States often treat in-state and out-of-state
relocation differently. The State of Ohio
reduces the penalties if the relocation is
made within the state. Connecticut sets no
penalty for in-state relocation, but requires
that “if the business relocates within state, it
must offer employment to its employees from
the original location if employment is available,
or the authority may terminate guarantee of
the loan.”42 The Michigan MEGA program
allows in-state relocation only if the
municipality condones the move. Some
states, such as Pennsylvania and Iowa,
prohibit in-state relocation altogether
unless it is the result of an expansion that
does not close or substantially reduce
operations at the originally subsidized
facility. Moreover, in Iowa a company is
eligible for a grant only if it has not closed
or reduced operations in one area of the
state to relocate in another.43

intends to operate for the term of the loan
or project period. This is problematic
because the company will not be
considered to be in violation of the
contract if it ceases operations before the
loan is repaid -- if it intended to operate
the plant for the agreed-upon time period.
It also means that the company can pay off
the loan early and leave without penalty.44
Therefore, if a municipality expects a
facility to remain in the locality for some
time beyond the loan term, it should
specify those expectations in the contract
and not treat the loan period as the benefit
period.

Set a benefits period
How much time should an assisted
company be given to make good on its
promises? “Benefit periods” are often set
arbitrarily in contracts even though
companies have a good sense of how long
it will take them to complete specific
projects. The company should provide
some guidance about the expected project
period, after which time the benefits (e.g.,
new employees hired, amount of capital
invested) should have materialized.
Without a benefit period, the company will
have an indefinite amount of time in which
to fulfill its promises.
When local governments use loan
programs, they expect that the assisted
company will not relocate until the loan
and interest have been repaid. Some
programs require the company to state
that, at the time the contract is signed, it
20

SECTION THREE:
DETERMINING BREACH OF CONTRACT
THROUGH MONTINORING AND DISCLOSURE
If a company does not comply with the
terms and conditions of the contact, it may
be considered to have “breached” it.
Although ceasing operations or relocating
out of state may look like clear violation of
an incentive agreement, determining when
an assisted firm has breached its contract is
not as simple as it may appear. Because a
finding of breach can lead to the
imposition of costly penalties and damages
(discussed in the next section), it is
important to clearly define what
constitutes a breach is in the agreement
itself.

Define breach of contract
A breach may be total or partial. Generally,
a total breach is failure by one party to
perform a significant obligation or
obligations under the agreement. A total
breach entitles the injured party to
suspend performance of its side of the
bargain and consider the contractual
relationship dissolved. If the nonbreaching party continues to carry out its
contractual obligations despite the other
party’s total breach, it may waive its right
to seek redress for the total breach.
A partial breach is a failure by one party to
perform a somewhat less significant
obligation under the agreement. For
example, an assisted company may create
21

the agreed-upon number of jobs but not
provide employees filling the positions
with some other promised benefit. Most
often a partial breach does not terminate a
contract; each party must continue to
perform its duties and seek redress
through negotiation, the courts, or through
the provisions of the agreement that
provide for such contingencies.
Determining what constitutes a “total” and
“partial” breach is often a nuanced legal
question that requires consultation with an
attorney. What is important here is that
parties may anticipate breaches and
provide solutions for them in the
agreement, which can eliminate the need
to resort to the courts should a breach
occur.
If a party does not want a particular breach
to terminate the entire contract, then a
statement outlining the specific
consequences for the specific violations
must be included in the contract. For
example the Indianapolis Economic
Development Corporation Memorandum of
Agreement (2002) provides:
The City, by and through the Metropolitan
Development Commission, reserves the right
to terminate property tax abatement
deductions for the project if it determines
that the applicant has not made reasonable
efforts to substantially comply with all of the
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commitments and the applicant’s failure to
substantially comply with the commitments
was not due to factors beyond its control.
In a specific case, breach was further
defined:
As used in this agreement, “substantial
compliance” shall mean the applicant’s
compliance with the following:
(i) making capital expenditures of not less
than $2,689,830 on the leased space;
and
(ii) the creation of not less than 95 new
permanent full-time positions with
average hourly wage rates of $12.65; and
(iii) the retention of 119 full-time positions
with average hourly wage rates of
$13.54.
If the company fails to comply with more
than one of the substantial compliance
categories, then repayment may be based
on the highest level of non-compliance.
Defining breach in this manner provides
the parties and, if necessary, ultimately a
court with some meaningful guidance in
enforcing the specific provisions of the
contract.
When incentives resemble “normal”
commercial instruments, such as
mortgages, leases, or loans, defining
breach is even more important. This is
because the intentions of the government
agency (“creating jobs”) may be different
from the standard obligations of the
financial instruments, such as making
regular loan payments.
In contract law, an immediate remedy is
available for almost any breach, although in
all but the most extreme cases, the party

found to be in breach must be given a
reasonable time to “cure” the default.
Minnesota companies receive a two-year
grace period to fulfill their contractual
obligations. The two-year period may be
extended by one year, but only if the
government agency holds a public hearing
to review the circumstances. In
Indianapolis, companies that have not met
the outlined performance standards are put
on probation for one year. If during the
probation period the standards are still not
met, the Indianapolis Economic
Development Corporation has the right to
cancel the incentive and require the
company to repay the percentage of the
incentive already received in proportion to
the percent of their obligation they failed
to achieve.

Define exceptions
There are exigent business circumstances
that may rightly excuse firms for failing to
meet their contractual promises. Such
exigencies can be accounted for in the
contract. For example, in some
agreements Ohio excuses a breach for
failure to create or retain the number of
jobs fixed in the agreement if that failure is
caused by “market conditions.” Under the
agreement, the Director of Economic
Development determines whether market
conditions caused the failure. In making
the determination, the Director must
define market conditions in consultation
with the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
by considering whether the following has
occurred:
a) Two consecutive quarters of decline in
manufacturing employment in Ohio as a
whole or, when relevant, by
manufacturing sector. The Director must
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rely on employment figures reported by
the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services.
b) A decline, as a whole or by a relevant
sector, in twelve of the last thirty six
months as detailed in the Federal
Reserve's national industrial production
index.
c) A decline within the relevant section of the
Standard and Poor's "Industrial Outlook.45

of any proposed change in the business
ownership, structure or control which would
materially affect the project.
Clauses that require notice only in an event
of a loan default or initiation of litigation
should be avoided. There are a number of
other adverse events that could forewarn a
substantial breach, and notice of these
needs to be expressly provided for in the
contract.

Include a notification provision

Specify monitoring practices

All contracts should include a notice
provision no matter how insignificant it
may seem. Notification requires that the
company alert the municipality and wider
community to any changes in its
operations, such as the initiation of any
lawsuits or bankruptcy proceedings, which
might adversely impact the subsidized
project. It also gives the economic
development agency some time to rectify
problems brought on by these changes –
e.g., to find a new tenant for an abandoned
facility, enlist the help of another developer
to complete the project, or cushion layoffs
with placement or retraining assistance.

Monitoring is the key ingredient to
ensuring compliance with incentive
agreements. Unfortunately, many local
governments are not vigilant once an
agreement has been made, often due to a
lack of resources. An investigative report
of Ohio’s enterprise zone program, for
example, found that no major city there
routinely visited subsidized companies to
monitor their compliance with legislated
performance standards.46 One official in
Kansas City noted that “We don't want to be
big brother, peering over their shoulders all the
time. . . We have tried to avoid the whole
notion of ‘auditing’”.47 And even where
attempts are made, subsidized firms are
less than cooperative or timely.

For example, a notice provision used by the
Florida Qualified Tax Industry Program
provides that:
A corporation must notify the state of any
developments that impact the agreement.
These may include commencement and full
implementation of the project, project delays
and cancellation of the project.
The Iowa New Jobs and Income Program
Contract goes a step further toward better
monitoring:
The business shall provide prompt advance
notice to the community and the department
23

The public sector needs to do more on this
front. Without monitoring, the time and
care that went into negotiating and
drafting the agreement is worth little. With
the decision to give an abatement must
also come the commitment to monitor
compliance once it has been made. And
this commitment to monitor – including
monitoring means and methodology –
should be spelled out in detail in the
agreement itself.
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There are two common monitoring
methods. The first requires that specified
documents be open to inspection and audit
by the granting authority. Indianapolis, for
example, requires a notarized annual
report from its subsidized companies. The
city also conducts spot audits on about 5
percent of subsidized companies, in which
a company has 24 hours to respond to a
series of questions about the number of
employees, wages, and capital investment
it has generated since the incentive was
awarded.
The second method is to impose an
affirmative obligation on the part of the
business to provide the necessary
information. This relieves often underresourced grantors from having to go out
and actually gather the data. Still, caution
is necessary. First, in the contract
government officials need to be specific
about the exact nature of the data desired.
Second, they need to be aware that these
requirements do not prevent a subsidy
recipient from misrepresenting the facts.
Businesses may provide their own
interpretations of their employment and
investment data. Requesting the raw data
helps avoid this scenario.
Perhaps the best way to guard against such
a possibility is to double check selfreported data from subsidized businesses
against labor market statistics collected by
the public sector, preferably the state’s
unemployment insurance records.
Unemployment records, maintained by
each state’s employment office, reflect not
only new hires but also every employee
and their wages each quarter. Thus, they
make for an ideal third-party-collected data
set against which to verify retention and
new hiring. Kansas City checks selfreported data against information derived

from the city’s employee earnings tax. It is
easy for state and local economic
development agencies to request this data
and work together with state employment
agencies to track the employment practices
of subsidized firms.
Legislation or contracts can also require
companies to disclose deal-specific
information to the general public.
Minnesota’s Subsidy Reform law requires
every recipient of an incentive to file an
annual report specifying the amount of the
incentive, the public purpose to be served,
the number and quality of jobs to be
generated, and any other special treatment
received. The law requires that each
redevelopment agreement set measurable
two-year goals and assess the corporation's
progress. Failure to meet the goals may
result in the repayment of the tax break
with interest. The Minnesota Department
of Employment and Economic
Development (DEED) collects and publishes
every disclosure report each June. The
reports are readily available to the public
from DEED, which also publishes a brief
summary of the data. The disclosure form
includes specific data on costs and
benefits, including type of subsidy and its
value, the number of jobs created, wages
paid, and benefits provided, as well as
other public purposes served by the deal.
Amendments made to the Minnesota law in
1999 are considered a model for
transparency legislation and contain
several improvements in the state's
disclosure format, such as:
•

More detailed wage disclosure (instead
of one aggregated average hourly
figure, companies must report the wage
for each new job within wage ranges).
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•

Health care disclosure (the company
must disclose the sum of wages plus
the hourly value of employer-paid
health care, also in ranges, so that it
will be obvious if the employer is
providing health care and, if so, what
its approximate value is).

•

Reporting on all subsidies the company
has received from multiple agencies for
a project.

•

Reporting on whether and from where
the company was relocating and why
the assisted project was not possible in
the company’s previous location.

•

Provision of the name and address of
the company’s parent corporation, so
that the state will know if multiple
subsidiaries of the same corporation
are receiving subsidies.

•

Finally, the amended law sets forth
penalties for companies that fail to
report by March 1 of each year. If a
company fails to report within 14 days
after the granting agency sends a
warning, the company must pay a fine
of $100 a day up to a maximum of
$1,000. All cities with a population of
2,500 or more and all state agencies
must file their reports with the state by
April 1, and they must file a report even
if it is only to say they had no
reportable deals for the year. The state
must warn the agency, and if the
agency fails to report by June 1, then
the agency loses the right to enter into
more deals until it complies.
The state must include in its final report
a list of companies that are ineligible to
receive new subsidies because they
have failed to achieve a goal in the last
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five years and have not paid back any of
the original incentive.
Other states, including Illinois, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Washington,
Nebraska, and Maine have recently
followed Minnesota’s example.48 Maine’s
disclosure law requires that corporations
receiving $10,000 or more in state
assistance provide annual reports on total
employment, job creation, and the wages
and benefits of existing jobs and jobs
created.49 The Economic Development
Incentives Commission, created by the new
law, was charged with studying the impact
and cost-effectiveness of corporate
subsidies and tax breaks and
recommending reforms that will increase
accountability.
In addition to establishing breach,
monitoring also allows third parties, such
as community organizations and unions, to
ensure that both the firm and the public
sector are complying with the terms of the
contract. Four states, Illinois, Ohio, North
Carolina, and Minnesota, now post relevant
information on particular deals on the
internet. Connecticut requires that
assisted companies make incentive reports
available to employee representatives if
they request them.50 Reporting
requirements become especially important
when a company is deciding to relocate,
downsize or engage in any other form of
restructuring because employee
representatives can use the report in their
own contract negotiations or publicize the
company’s other obligations. Employees
can also assist municipalities in monitoring
the firm’s behavior and applying additional
pressure to adhere to the contract.
The public interest in information,
however, faces a countervailing business
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interest in corporate confidentiality. Many
contracts have confidentiality clauses to
protect “proprietary business information.”
Public dealmakers should closely scrutinize
blanket clauses that leave the public in the
dark.
Companies have legitimate interests in
trade secrets, such as customer lists or
profit-loss statements, which in the hands
of a competitor could harm a business.51
However, few subsidy applications, except
perhaps business loans, require such
information. In other words, the kinds of
data required for compliance monitoring in
development agreements (e.g.,
employment levels, local capital
expenditures and the like) is not likely to
constitute proprietary business
information. The onus should be on the
company to demonstrate how disclosure of
the kind of data called for could
disadvantage it with its competitors in
order for it to be subject to confidentiality
clauses.
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SECTION THREE:
PENALTIES FOR BREACH
Contractual mechanisms must impose
penalties on businesses that fail to live up
to the promises made in exchange for
incentives. Specifying performance and
disclosure requirements only solves part of
the problem; ensuring compliance requires
agreeing to penalties for noncompliance.
A breach of contract should trigger a host
of remedies and damages, many of which
should be specifically laid out in the
contract itself. Penalties are particularly
important when they are not specified in
the enabling state statute or local
ordinance. Without guidance from
contract language or statute, courts have
the authority to decide what the damages
should be.

Opt for “back-loaded” incentives
whenever possible
Extensive penalty language is less
important when municipalities and states
structure incentives so that they pay out
only when the company meets specified
performance benchmarks. The
benchmarks can be laid out incrementally
over time, releasing a specified amount of
the incentive at each stage. Doing so
generally results in less need to recapture
funds because of nonperformance further
down the road. By placing the burden on
companies to prove that they have
qualified for the incentives, public officials
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are freed from the responsibility of
enforcing accountability provisions – a
painful and litigious process. Local
governments find these kinds of incentives
to be easy to use. They are more politically
palatable because the taxpayers are already
enjoying the benefits from the project and
are perceived to be “sharing” some of the
increased tax revenues.52
Tax increment financing (TIF) deals are
often structured in this “pay-as-you-go”
manner. Such an arrangement means that
a developer is reimbursed for the money
spent on eligible TIF costs (e.g.,
demolition, parcel assembly, infrastructure
development) by the municipality on an
annual basis as tax increment revenues
become available. These kinds of TIF
agreements have built in performance and
enforcement controls. The redevelopment
agreement can be written so that in the
event that a developer fails to make the
needed investments, the municipality can
withhold future payments.
Each TIF redevelopment agreement
negotiated by the City of Chicago contains
as “Issuance of a Certificate of Completion”
section. It specifies that:
the City has the right to terminate the
Redevelopment Agreement, cease
disbursement of City funds, and seek
reimbursement from the development of
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City funds if the project is not completed
per the Redevelopment Agreement.
In agreements that include the issuance of
public notes or bonds, a provision is
included allowing the City the right to seek
reimbursement “provided that the City is
entitled to rely on an opinion of counsel that
such reimbursement will not jeopardize taxexempt status, if any, of the Bonds.”
A provision in some of the City of Chicago’s
redevelopment agreements states that if
the developer fails to complete the project,
the municipality has:
the right (but not the obligation) to
complete those TIF-funded improvements
that are public improvements and to pay
for the costs of TIF-funded improvements
(including interest costs) out of City funds
or other City monies. In the event that
the aggregate cost of completing the TIFfunded improvements exceeds that
amount of City funds available, the
Developer shall reimburse the City for all
reasonable costs and expenses incurred by
the City in completing such TIF-funded
improvements in excess of the available
City funds….53
Similarly, the Michigan Economic
Development Training Grant uses an award
schedule that only provides grant funds to
the company as it meets certain program
milestones. The state assumes less of a
risk for training workers by holding more
of the funds until the program is
completed.
The use of this kind of structure, however,
is not possible in all cases. Performancebased incentives are less popular with
businesses, many of whom prefer to
receive lump sum payments to cover
construction and other start-up costs.

When a company has cash flow issues and
needs funding up-front, they may not be
willing to wait around until a government
agency can evaluate performance
measures. However, if project costs are
incurred and paid out over a longer period
of time, a back-loaded structure will be
more appropriate.

Include non-performance
provisions
If public funds must change hands up front,
nonperformance provisions must be
written into the contract. And even in the
pay-as-you go context, one should carefully
consider scenarios where a default could
occur after a benchmark has been met. For
example, if a payment is tied to a specific
level of employment being reached, what
happens if, after the payment, the company
discharges most of these new employees?
Non-performance (or, more aptly here,
undoing performance) provisions also
make sense in this and many other pay-asyou-go scenario.
Non-performance provisions generally fall
into five categories:
•

Rescission: canceling a subsidy
agreement if job and revenue
projections are not met;

•

Clawback: recovery of all or part of
subsidy costs if performance goals are
not met;

•

Recalibration: adjustment of subsidy to
reflect changing business conditions;

•

Penalty: additional charges (e.g., the
interest accrued on the public's
investment) for non-performance or
relocation; and
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•

Debarment and suspension: prohibiting
the non-compliant company from
receiving incentives in the future.

Non-performance provisions should always:
(a) state when the mechanism is triggered
(i.e. the event that signals the breach); and
(b) describe the penalty that will be
exacted after a specified grace period.

RESCISSION
While it is a rare non-performance
provision, rescission terminates the
incentive agreement in the event of nonperformance. Unfortunately, if rescission is
the only remedy specified, companies can
breach the agreement mid-stream in a way
that leaves the granting agency little value
for its money. For example, rescission
could allow a business to walk away from a
development mid-stream, leaving nothing
but a partially constructed project of little
financial value. Thus, in addition to
rescission, it is always necessary to include
other remedies. The following is an
example of a rescission provision from the
Idaho Community Development Block
Grant Program:
The department shall have the right to
terminate this contract in whole or in
part, at any time before the date of
completion, whenever it is determined the
grantee has failed to comply with the
conditions of the contract. The
department shall promptly notify the
grantee in writing of the determination
and the reasons for the termination and
the effective date.

CLAWBACKS
A “clawback” clause allows a grantor to
take back previously conferred money or
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benefits upon a specified breach by the
grant recipient. Clawbacks can be tied to
almost anything, including the number of
employees, magnitude of capital
investment, years in residence, or square
footage of space developed. Once the
grant recipient fails to meet a benchmark
in the contract, the clawback clause kicks
in, entitling the grantor to repayment of
the benefits conferred or other appropriate
remedies. For example, in its deal with
Roll-Kraft, Inc., the city of Mentor, Ohio
included the following clawback clause in
its property tax abatement agreement:
If Roll-Kraft materially fails to fulfill its
obligations under this agreement, for
reasons other than downturns of
economic or business cycles, or if the City
of Mentor determines that the
certification as to delinquent taxes
required by this agreement is fraudulent,
the City of Mentor shall give at least 60
days written notice thereof to Roll-Kraft.
Roll-Kraft shall have the opportunity to
cure such default within such period, but
if such default is not cured within such 60
day period, the City may terminate or
modify the exemption from taxation
granted under this agreement and may
require the repayment of the amount of
taxes that would have been payable had
the property not been exempted from
taxation under this agreement.54
The City of Roanoke, Virginia ties the
recapture to real estate:
In the event the company fails to increase
the square feet of occupancy by 20,000
square feet, the company shall repay to
the [agency] the amount of five dollars
per square foot for each square foot of
increase less than 20,000 square feet.55
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Iowa ties the recapture to job creation:
If the company fails to create and
maintain the agreed number of jobs, it
must repay a certain portion of the
incentives it received depending on how
well it has complied with the job creation
goals. The business is not liable for any
amount if it meets more than 90% of its
job creation obligations. If the business
has met less than 50% of its obligations,
it must repay the same percentage in
benefits as it fails to create in jobs. If the
business created more than 50 % but less
than 75% of its requirement, the business
must pay one half of the percentage in
benefits as it failed to create in jobs. If
the business creates more than 75 % but
less than 90%, it must pay one quarter of
the percentage it failed to create in jobs.56
The statutory guidelines for the Ohio Tax
Credit Program tie recapture to the amount
of time the company remains in the state:
The maximum amount the authority can
recapture depends on the amount of time
the company remained at the project site:
(1) If the company maintained operations
at the location for one and one-half times
the number of years of the term of the tax
credit, up to 25% of the total allowed
credits may be refunded; (2) If it
maintained operations for the term of the
tax credit, the amount required to be
refunded cannot exceed 50% of the
allowed credits; (3) If the company
relocates operations within the term of
the tax credit, the authority may require
the company to refund up to 100% of
the allowed credits.57
While these examples are illustrative, it
should be noted that clawbacks can be tied
to any conceivable contractual

requirement. What is critical is that each
clawback remedy be tied to specific types
or category of breaches and that the
magnitude of the clawback has a reasonable
connection to the magnitude of the breach.
Courts are very reluctant to impose a
remedy – even if contractually agreed to –
that amounts to a huge windfall for one
party and a huge penalty for the other.

RECALIBRATIONS
Recalibration provisions allow local
governments to adjust the incentive to
reflect changing business conditions. With
such modifications, the agreement does
not need to be completely terminated if
certain aspects of the relationship change.
A contract may provide explicit provisions
for making the recalibration request. In
Texas, a business may request a
modification if:
it is required to reduce or eliminate [its]
work force because of 1) reductions in
overall employment within an industry; 2)
a substantial change in the skills required
to continue the employer’s business exists
because of technological changes; or 3)
other reasonable factors, as determined
by the executive director.58
Unfortunately, when governments and
firms agree to penalties that can be easily
modified to fit contingencies, the penalties
do not provide the same incentive to fulfill
the contractual obligations. Still,
recalibration clauses have their uses. They
are most common in low-interest loan
programs. Local governments have been
able to raise the rate of their loans if the
assisted company is not meeting the
contractual obligations of the loan.
A Pennsylvania program levies a penalty of
two points over the prime rate if a
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THE INTEL DEAL
The 1994 incentive agreement signed by
the Intel Corporation and Washington
County, Oregon and City of Hillsboro
contained remedies for recovering
public funds in the event that the
company failed to comply with the
provisions of the agreement for hiring
and making service fee payments to the
local governments.
The following provisions are excerpted
from the agreement:
4.1.3.1. If, in any Hiring Year that such
requirements apply, Intel fails to meet the
job creation, retention and compensation
requirements of Paragraphs 2.2.1 through
2.2.4, Intel shall pay an amount equal to
100% of the net property tax savings of
the tax year containing the end of such
Hiring Year.
4.1.4. Intel may file an action in
Washington County Circuit Court or
Federal District Court for Oregon to
contest this determination. Payment of
the amount in dispute shall be a

company is found to be out of compliance.
An agency inspector can waive the penalty
if the cause of the violation is reasonable,
such as a general economic downturn.59

DEBARMENT AND SUSPENSION
Debarment provisions prohibit a company
from ever doing further business with the
public agency in the event of a breach.
Suspension provisions are a similar bar but
for a limited term. The federal government
has long used the threat of debarment to
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precondition to contesting the notice of
non-compliance. County shall place the
amount in dispute into a trust and agency
account pending final resolution, with
interest accruing to Intel at the rate
earned if Intel prevails.
If in any tax year, Intel fails to pay the
community service fee required under
paragraph 2.4, County may collect late
payment penalty and interest on the
delinquent CSF payment equal to the same
penalty and interest as is charged by the
County on all delinquent personal property
accounts. In addition to any other remedy,
failure to pay CSF by March 1 shall be
basis for a finding of breach and noncompliance, and shall require payment to
the County of 100% of the net property tax
savings for that tax year.
Intel shall have the burden of documenting
compliance with this Agreement. Intel
shall provide to the County such
documentation or information as County
requires to verify compliance with the
Agreement.

enforce its fair labor, health, and safety
standards, and states have included similar
provisions in their public works contracts.60
State incentive programs may bar
noncompliant firms from receiving any
future subsidies from a particular program
or from receiving any form of future
assistance from the same state. Such
penalties, however, are less common at the
local level. In these matters, the courts
tend to defer to the states so that the right
to debar should be explicitly authorized by
statute.61 In Minnesota, for example,
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companies that fail to pay their clawbacks
are prohibited from obtaining any new
subsidies in the state for five years from
the date the breach was discovered.62

Ask for attorneys’ fees, costs, and
interest
Even if a governmental unit, citizen’s
group, or private party wins a case against
a breaching corporation, it will not be
made whole if it has to pay attorney’s fees
and court costs out of its recovery.
A contract provision requiring payment of
fees and costs is a good hedge against this
risk. In the case of grants, municipalities
can also request interest on funds used by
the subsidized firm that might have
otherwise been invested by the local
government in an interest-bearing account.
Because the validity of an attorneys’ fees
clause varies from state to state, it would
be wise to check state law before including
such a provision.

Familiarize yourself with other
forms of damages and relief
There are a number of different kinds of
damages or relief available to local
governments; they can be available as a
general matter of contract law, by
agreement of the parties, and according to
specific legislation. Unless the state
enabling legislation provides that a remedy
is to be exclusive, or the parties agree in
the contract itself that this is the case, the
grantor may be in a position to ask for
specific performance or expectation,
reliance, or restitution damages.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
In some circumstances, a local government
may ask a court to make the assisted

business keep its promise. This kind of
relief is referred to as “specific
performance” and may take the form of a
court order requiring some action, such as
compliance with a minimum wage
agreement or an injunction forbidding the
company from closing its plant. This
remedy is available only when “the remedy
at law is inadequate,” i.e., when monetary
damages will not fully compensate the
granting authority. This could be the case
when either (a) the value of the product or
performance promised is so unique that
money is no substitute or (b) monetary
damages would be difficult or impossible
to estimate. 63 A court will not order
specific performance if that performance is
impossible or unreasonably burdensome.
In general, courts are very reluctant to
compel specific performance of any type,
let alone ordering the continued
operations of a production facility. City and
state officials can anticipate this preference
when drafting contracts by specifying
monetary damages, the threat of which
may compel the desired behavior.

EXPECTATION DAMAGES
These damages are intended to place the
injured party in the position it would have
been in had the other party kept its
promise. When local governments provide
incentives to private firms for new jobs,
they expect that those jobs will materialize
and that individuals holding the positions
will purchase goods and services within the
jurisdiction. If a municipality has
conducted cost-benefit analysis before the
incentive changed hands, it would have an
estimate of the value of the anticipated
public benefits that could be awarded to
the slighted jurisdiction.64 The government
agency may also find itself in a position to
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recover lost taxes and other public benefits
that it expected. If the assisted firm has
committed to keeping emissions to a
specified minimum level and does not, it
might be sued for the reasonable cost of
reducing pollution to that level.
Courts, however, are reluctant to award
damages that are too speculative.
Therefore, the more comprehensive and
detailed the cost-benefit analysis, the
better chance a local government has of
recovering expectation damages.
Moreover, courts will only award this kind
of damages if they are “foreseeable” in that
at the time of the agreement, the parties
likely foresaw that the damages would
occur in event of a breach. Conducting the
cost-benefit analysis up front and making
the expected benefits part of the
agreement helps resolve this forseeability
issue in favor of the grantor.

RELIANCE DAMAGES
These damages are not intended to reflect
the benefit expected but instead the extent
to which the injured party suffered losses
while acting in reasonable reliance on a
promise that was broken. In other words,
the goal of reliance damages is to put a
party in the position it would have been
had the promise never been made. This
means that costs incurred before the
agreement was reached are not
recoverable. These damages tend to be
lower in amount than expectation damages
because a rational granting agency will only
offer an incentive package if the expected
benefits outweigh the potential costs.65
Reliance damages are easier to recover
than expectation damages because they
are, generally, less vague. In theory, if
accurate records are kept of expenditures
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reliance damages are easier to quantify
than expectation damages. In addition to
the value of the inducement, municipalities
can ask for the interest that would have
accrued on the incentive if it had not been
disbursed, the costs associated with an
ancillary investment in infrastructure for
the project, and the legal and
administrative costs incurred for the
project. Though more difficult to measure,
the social costs that accrue to the
municipality because of business relocation
(e.g., retraining employees, taking a loss on
property transferred to the municipality)
may also be requested, though because of
their less concrete nature, they are less
likely to be awarded by a court.

RESTITUTION AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
“Clawback” clauses can embody the
principles of restitution damages and
liquidated damages. Restitution damages
reflect the benefit the local government
conferred upon the non-performing
business minus the portion of the benefits
the business conferred on the government.
The point is to prevent unjust enrichment,
i.e., one party benefiting at the other's
expense. In most cases, the amount is
equal to the economic development
expenditure (i.e., the property taxes abated
or market value of a land write-down) less
the value of whatever lasting investment
the business made.
Liquidated damages are damages agreed
upon in the event of a specified breach.
Generally, such contractual provisions are
enforceable if three criteria are met: (a) the
injury due to breach is uncertain or difficult
to quantify; (b) the value of the damages
reasonably approximates the probable loss;
and (c) the damages are not designed to
deter or punish a breach. If the value of an
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inducement to the local government is $30
million, but the contract provision provides
for damages of $60 million, it will not be
enforced even if the parties intended to be
bound. However, if enabling legislation
governing the inducement allows or
requires a penalty so denominated, it may
override normal contract law.66 Whether
such a statutory provision is valid will
depend on applicable state law, which
varies from state to state.
The key point here is that clearly designed
and drafted clawback clauses can help
avoid litigation. When a subsidized
business is faced with clear penalties for its
failure to comply with the requirements of
an incentive package, it should make
financial sense for it to comply within the
terms negotiated.

Include a waiver provision
All contracts should contain a waiver
provision to protect the public sector from
losing its rights under the contract if it
delays enforcement. Economic
development agencies often hold off
enforcing incentive contracts, attempting
other non-legal means to get the nonperforming business to honor its promises.
It is also possible that a new administration
may wish to enforce conditions where its
predecessor did not.67 Without a waiver
clause, these delays could be interpreted as
a waiver of the breach by the granting
agency. A waiver clause could read: “No
failure to insist on the prompt performance by
the company of its obligations under the
agreement shall be construed as a waiver by
the department of its rights under the
contract.”

Seek support from community
organizations
Grassroots campaigns and negative press
can complement measures that local
governments take to enforce contracts.
Community groups have organized an
increasing number of petition drives and
referenda to place subsidies and
performance measures on local ballots.
Their power lies in their ability to raise
community awareness of the deal terms,
which may shame companies into better
behavior. For example, after local
organizations complained publicly of a deal
gone bad, ABB Instrumentation announced
that it would give back $1.1 million to the
Monroe County (New York) Industrial
Development Authority when it failed to
create the agreed-upon number of jobs.
Coalitions of community groups have been
involved in similar kinds of efforts to
obtain what are called Community Benefits
Agreements (CBA) from assisted developers
and businesses.68 A CBA is a legally
enforceable contract signed by community
organizations and developers. In it the
developer agrees to provide certain
benefits and the community organizations
promise support for the project that will
aid in the developer’s dealings with those
government agencies responsible for
permitting, zoning, and financing the new
development. It is typically negotiated
before the actual incentive agreement, but
can be incorporated into it if all parties
agree.
In May of 2001, a coalition of labor and
community-based organizations – the
Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic
Justice – negotiated a landmark CBA for the
Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment
34

THE IDEAL DEAL
District development, a massive mixed-use
project located next to the Staples Center
sports arena. Among other things, the CBA
required the developer to:
•

Provide an assessment of community
park and recreation needs, and a
commit $1 million toward meeting
those needs;

•

Increase the proportion of affordable
housing in the residential unit mix and
provide seed money for additional
affordable units;

•

Provide parking for the adjacent
residential area;

•

Assure that 70% of the jobs created in
the project would pay the City’s living
wage; and

•

Agree to consultation with the coalition
on selection of tenants.

Formally requiring some sort of public
participation in the process from the start
allows such groups to gain a sense of
ownership over the deal and can lead to a
complementary CBA.
In some places, taxpayers have demanded
that subsidies be subject to the community
approval. Wisconsin requires a voter
referenda if a portion of the electorate
seeks to challenge the subsidy:
The governing body may issue bonds
under this section without submitting the
proposition to the electors of the
municipality for approval unless within
30 days from the date of publication or
notice of adoption of the initial resolution
for such bonds, a petition, signed by not
less than 5% of the registered electors of
the municipality is filed with the clerk of
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the municipality requesting a referendum
upon the question of the issuance of the
bonds. If such a petition is filed, the
bonds shall not be issued until approved
by a majority of the electors of the
municipality voting thereon at a general
or special election.69
Moreover, legislation can provide for a
private right of enforcement by third
parties to the contract. This would allow
private citizens, unions, and community
groups legal standing to sue a business
that violates the law. Without such
legislation, third parties often have no such
right.

CONCLUSION

Anecdotal evidence suggests that cities and
states are becoming more assertive in their
incentive negotiations with business.
Approximately half of the major cities and
states in the Midwest have successfully
enforced at least one clawback clause in
the last 5 years.70 Indianapolis was the
front runner, having found 30 companies
to be out of compliance since 1993--the
year in which it established job goals and
wage standards for all business incentive
programs. For example, Indianapolis
signed a deal with United Airlines giving it
about $300 million in tax breaks for a new
maintenance hub at the Indianapolis
International Airport.71 In return the airline
made two promises: to invest $800 million
by the end of 2001 and to create at least
6,300 full-time jobs by the end of 2004.
When United failed to meet its first
promise, it agreed to pay $31 million to
Indiana government agencies in prorated
clawback fines.72
Other cities have followed suit. For
example, in September 2002 the Kansas
City redevelopment agency sued Aquila
Merchant Services Inc. to recapture tax
incentives it had awarded the business.73
The suit claimed that the company violated
an agreement to employ at least 400
workers downtown, and in doing so
activated a clawback designed to reimburse
the incentives. Aquila quickly settled the

case by returning $1.57 million in tax
abatements to the agency.
Although using performance standards is
certainly better than giving away subsidies
for free, local governments still draft
contracts too loosely and enforce them too
weakly to substantially increase the return
on the public’s investment. Or economic
development practitioners give up before
they start. They figure that even when they
write excellent contracts, there is no
guarantee that businesses will stick to their
promises.
Defeatism is no excuse for ignoring the
public’s investment in economic
development. Nor is the fear that many
practitioners have of developing a
reputation for “aggressive” and “antibusiness” behavior. Local officials are
often concerned that these contractual
mechanisms lower the value of the
incentive for the company if the company
perceives future tussles with the law, a lack
of flexibility on the part of the public
sector, and additional reporting
requirements and compliance costs.
Research has revealed that such fears are
likely overstated.74 If firms are aware of
accountability provisions from the start of
negotiations, formalizing the quid pro quo
in a contract can actually clarify the
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expectations of both parties, reducing the
uncertainty and potential for arbitrary
behavior that plagues incentives. If
accountability mechanisms are clear and
reasonable, firms may voluntarily repay the
incentive if they renege on their promises,
obviating the need for any formal legal
enforcement.
Moreover, if more municipalities and states
adopt these kinds of contractual provisions
as normal practice, individual governments
cannot claim that accountability
mechanisms hamper their ability to
compete for business relative to those that
do not regulate incentives.
This handbook has stressed the importance
of contractual provisions in protecting
public interests. The following box
displays selected model legislative
language drafted by Good Jobs First that
can be adopted for use in specific contracts
and municipal ordinances. It brings
together several of the main areas of
emphasis in this handbook: performance
standards, monitoring provisions, and
enforcement mechanisms.
Our hope is that by including these kinds
of legal provisions, practitioners can both
perform better in negotiations with
companies seeking subsidies and also
monitor and enforce these agreements
after the incentives have changed hands.
Without such protections, the fiscal health
of every municipality and state is made
more vulnerable.
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MODEL DEAL LEGISLATION:
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
Good Jobs First has drafted model legislation,
several sections of which are excerpted here:
SEC. 7 SUBSIDY LIMIT AND JOB QUALITY STANDARDS
a. A granting body shall not grant award a
development subsidy if the cost per job is
greater than $35,000.00. Such cost shall be
determined by dividing the amount of the
subsidy by the number of full-time jobs required
under the application approved by the granting
body.
b. A granting body shall not grant a subsidy to an
applicant unless the wages paid to employees at
the project site are equal to or exceed 85% of
the average wage as established under
paragraphs (12) and (13) of section 5, provided,
however, that for small businesses, the average
wage must equal or exceed 75% of the wages
established thereunder. The computation of
wages under this section shall only apply to a
recipient corporation that provides the health
care coverage as approved in its application by
the granting body.
SEC. 8 RECAPTURE
a. A recipient corporation shall fulfill its job
creation, wage, health care and other benefit
requirements for the project site within two
years of the date of subsidy. Such recipient shall
maintain its wage and benefit goals as long as
the subsidy is in effect, or five years, whichever
is longer.
b. The corporate parent of a recipient corporation
must maintain at least 90% of its employment in
the State as long as the development subsidy is
in effect, or not less than five years, whichever
is longer.
c. If the requirements under paragraphs (a) or (b)
are not fulfilled , the granting body shall
recapture the development subsidy from the
recipient corporation as follows:
Upon a failure by the recipient corporation to
create the required number of jobs or to pay
the required wages or benefits, the amount
recaptured shall be based on the pro rata
amount by which the unfulfilled jobs, wages or
benefits bear to the total amount of the
development subsidy. Upon a failure of the
corporate parent to maintain 90% of its

employment in the State, the rate of recapture
shall equal twice the percentage by which such
employment is less than 90%.
d. The granting body shall provide notice to the
recipient corporation of its intent to recapture
the development subsidy and state the reasons
and amount to be recaptured. The recipient
corporation shall remit to the governing body
such amount within 60 calendar days of the
date of such notice.
e. If a recipient corporation defaults on a
development subsidy in three consecutive
calendar years, the granting body shall declare
the subsidy null and void, and shall so notify the
Department of Development and the recipient
corporation. The recipient corporation shall pay
back to the granting body all remaining value of
the development subsidy it has not previously
repaid within 180 calendar days of the date of
the notice of such default.
SEC. 9 PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT ACTION
If a granting body fails to enforce any provision of
this Act, any individual who paid personal income
taxes to the State in the calendar year prior to the
year in dispute, or any organization representing
such taxpayers, shall be entitled to bring a civil
action in state court to compel enforcement under
this statute. The court shall award reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs to such prevailing
taxpayer or organization.
SEC. 10 PUBLIC RECORD DISCLOSURE
All records required to be prepared or maintained
under this Act, including but not limited to
applications, progress reports, recapture notices
and any other records or proceedings relating
thereto, shall be subject to disclosure under the
State's Open Records Act.
SEC. 11 SEPARABILITY
If any provision of this Act is determined to be
unenforceable in a court of law, such
determination shall not affect the validity or
enforceability of any other provision of the Act.
SOURCE:
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/
accountable_development/model_legislation.cfm
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